Existence of Nash Equilibrium of an M/M/1 queueing-inventory system
No video of the event yet, sorry!
In this talk, we will be discuss about the behavior of customers in a single server queueing-inventory system for unobservable case, were the arrival process is according to a Poisson process; the service time is exponentially distributed and we restrict ourselves that the items in the inventory are homogeneous. We assume that customers individually decide on the issues such as "whether to queue or not to queue (balk)" and "whether to purchase the item or not". An (s, Q) policy is adopted and lead time follows exponential distribution. A customer can be served exactly one item from the inventory at service completion epoch; however we assume that no external arrival is allowed to join the queue when items in the inventory becomes empty, such arrivals are considered as lost (lost sales). Several performance measures are computed. We investigate the customer’s individual optimal strategies such as whether "to queue or not queue" and "to purchase the item or not". Finally, we will look into the optimal pricing issue that maximizes the revenue of the system and socially optimal strategy for unobservable case.
- 2018 September 25 - 10:30
- 30 min
- Stochastic Modeling and Applied Research of TechnologY
- 2. Game Theory in Queueing